Why is cabinda not connected to angola

Oh, and Cabinda is very, very rich. Mingas went on to apologize for the loss of Togolese life:. The Angolan government had to know that there was a risk of violence during the tournament, a risk they could have mitigated by moving matches out of Cabinda.

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Niger school fire leaves dozens of children dead. The small province is responsible for 60 percent of oil production in the country but locals say they do not benefit from its revenues. Related News. Category News. Boeing agrees to compensate families of victims of Ethiopia MAX crash. Tigrayan forces accused of raping women in Ethiopia's Amhara region. Some of these associations had a regional character, as was the case of the Mayombe Alliance. Although no military action was attributed to FLEC until some time after its foundation, the organisation did attempt to enter the political scene in by establishing a 'Government of Cabinda in Exile' in Kinshasa.

Its headquarters in the Cabindan border town of Tschela, did not however undertake any guerrilla activities. It was not until after the collapse of the Salazar regime in Portugal in April that there was a real 'explosion' of separatist sentiments, emerging from a long period of lethargy.

This upsurge of nationalism took place against the backdrop of an extremely complex context in Angola, characterised by confrontation between the three armed nationalist movements the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA on the one hand, and the aspirations of some sectors of colonial society for a Rhodesian white-dominated type of independence, on the other.

The MPLA leadership blamed the rebirth of Cabindan separatism in the Kinshasa- and Brazzaville-based media on the oil companies, in particular the French company ELF, and on the local political leaders. Although never entirely severed after independence, official contacts between the Angolan government and Cabinda's separatist movements resumed during the s. To assist with this, prominent figures of Cabindan origin with high posts in Angola's political and administrative structures were committed to that issue, and the prestigious positions they occupied constituted a real attraction to most Cabindans.

If this situation caused serious embarrassment to the separatist movement, it was not, for that matter, a great success, for it failed to persuade the most important figures to subscribe to Angola's "policy of national reconciliation". In fact everything indicates that the two sides did not share the same spirit or philosophical approach to this process, as illustrated by records of the proceedings of some of these meetings from the s onwards.

While the separatist delegates presented the future status of Cabinda as a priority item on the agenda, the government representatives for a long time attempted to deal with the issue solely within the framework of its policy of forgiveness and national reconciliation. While the separatist movements attempted to discuss the future of the enclave, the government tried to conduct the meetings as dialogue between "Angolan brothers", causing the repeated breakdown of rounds of negotiations.

Between and Gabon and Congo hosted a series of meetings between the Angolan government and the various Cabindan independence factions, in Pointe-Noire, Brazzaville Congo , and Libreville Gabon. The talks were a genuine 'dialogue of the deaf' and dealt mostly with questions of protocol.

The Cabindan delegates, who appeared increasingly divided, complained constantly that they were treated with less respect than their Angolan counterparts. After overcoming these issues, the parties addressed the question of what the first agenda item should be. When the Angolan government finally agreed in the s to discuss the issue of Cabinda's future status first, another problem emerged that the government treated as an obstacle to solving the Cabinda question: the constant divisions between the separatist movements.

Their differences ranged from strategic issues to simple questions of personality and leadership struggles.

The fact that some of these divisions resulted in desertions and in some separatist leaders allying with the Angolan government whether through choice or persuasion , seems to corroborate accusations by the independence movements of attempts to "undermine them from within". The Angolan government has since argued, with increasing insistence, that the alleged lack of interlocutors caused by the separatist movements' constant divisions is the main obstacle to dialogue.

Several factors can be identified as the origins of these divisions. Firstly, a close examination of Cabindan separatism reveals tendencies related to the different formative experiences of the Cabindan diaspora in Central Africa. Franque, Tchioufou, Raoul and other figures of Cabindan origin were not educated within the same intellectual or socio-political context as each other. They were too intimately involved in the socio-political processes of the countries where they were formed as people and political activists to remain immune to the conflicting aspirations and strategic interests of the two Congos.

There are also divisions between inhabitants of the Mayombe forest and those of the coastal areas, specifically Cabinda City, with the former accused of denying Cabindan 'legitimacy' to the latter. Still further divisions exist between Francophone and Lusophone communities, creating a particular challenge for the new generation of activists, whose education took place in the post-colonial Angolan context.

Their cohabitation with peers whose socio-political and intellectual roots lie in the two Congos is not always peaceful. Finally, there are complex personal interests and aspirations. These divisions have provided the Angolan government significant room for manoeuvre, both in provoking desertions and in simply promoting "understanding" of its position. Since the end of the war with UNITA, the war in Cabinda has increased in intensity, with the government conducting "mop-up operations".

Angolan civil society organisations and opposition parties have traded accusations with the government concerning events in the enclave in recent years.

Several reports have accused the government of gross human rights abuses, without, however, giving equal attention to the behaviour of the Cabindan factions.

At the end of , half a dozen high-level FLEC commanders handed themselves in to the Angolan authorities and were subsequently integrated into the national army, but even this serious blow has not brought the skirmishes to an end.